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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. 
According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which con-
siders that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally effica-
cious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms 
of mental states.
Keywords: folk psychology, propositional attitudes ascriptions, reasons, expressivism, de-
scriptivism .
RESUMO
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar um desafio à visão recebida na psicologia popular. De 
acordo com este desafio, a suposição semântica por trás da visão recebida, que considera 
que as proposições de atitude proposicional são descrições dos comportamentos subja-
centes internos causalmente eficazes, não podem explicar a função principal de razões em 
termos de estados mentais.
Palavras-chave: psicologia popular, adscrição de atitudes proposicionais, razões, expres-
sivismo, descritivismo.
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Introduction
Humans spend the majority of their time engaged in social situations carrying out coop-
erative projects and interacting with each other. This vast amount of interactions would not be 
possible without a particular kind of skill to deal with social situations. Traditionally, this social 
virtuosity is bound to the ability to understand agential actions through psychological concepts 
such as beliefs, desires, fears, hopes and numerous other mental terms (von Eckardt, 1994). This 
unique human capacity is known as mindreading, mentalizing, folk psychology, or theory of mind. 
The received view about social cognition, thus, claims that the ability of human beings to navigate 
the social world relies on their capacity to ascribe mental states (paradigmatically, propositional 
attitudes) for the purpose of understanding, explaining and predicting behavior. The primary goal 
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of a mindreader is to reason about the role of these attitudes 
and states in bringing out a particular behavior (see Apperly, 
2011, p. 4-5)2. 
Questions concerning the emergence and functioning of 
folk psychology are some of the most central in the debates in 
cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind in recent decades. 
The basic focus of discussion on folk psychology has been the 
nature of the mechanism underlying the process of attribu-
tion of mental states to explain and predict behavior. In early 
debates, two polarizing views came to dominate the contro-
versy. On the one hand, the theory-theory view defends the 
idea that mental state attributions are produced by a kind of 
theorization based on a systematic corpus of knowledge de-
tailing the connections between perceptual inputs, internal 
states and behavioral outputs (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gopnik 
and Meltzoff, 1997). On the other hand, simulation-theory 
contends that the process is carried out by different simula-
tion mechanisms based on introspections or off-line sub-per-
sonal mechanisms (Goldman, 1989; Heal, 1996).3 
In the last decade, a group of dissenters have spoken out 
against the received view (Andrews, 2012; Hutto, 2004; Mc-
Geer, 2007, 2015; Millikan, 2004; Strijbos and Bruin, 2012; 
Zawidzki, 2008, 2013). The main strategy of this heterodox 
view has been to undermine the centrality that the received 
view has assigned to mindreading; i.e., these scholars share 
their refusal of the idea that mindreading is the linchpin of 
social cognition. As Gallagher says: “[This new approach] 
rejects the supposition of universality in regard to mental-
izing, either by theory or by simulation. Rather, mentalizing 
or mindreading are, at best, specialized abilities that are rel-
atively rarely employed” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 165). Instead, 
propositional attitude ascriptions are taken to be a small part 
of a bigger set of regulative responses to failures of predictions. 
From this view, propositional attitude ascriptions appear in 
contexts where anticipatory capacities fail; when the target’s 
behavior violates the expectations of the attributer:
we expect people to exhibit behavioral 
patterns similar to those they have shown 
in the past. Some people usually come to 
work on foot and on time, others drive or 
take the metro and often arrive late […] We 
take these patterns into account, betting on 
their continuation when it is useful or nec-
essary to do so. When we use belief-desire 
psychology, it is almost always for explana-
tion after the fact, not for prediction. We 
may explain why John always has yogurt 
for breakfast by saying he must like it, but 
if he actually eats yogurt only for his health, 
it won’t matter to our predictions (Millikan, 
2004, p. 22). 
Rather than predictive or explanatory tools, proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions are tools for rationalizing or justi-
fying behaviors, that is, showing that a course of action is nor-
malized or accepted by certain norms that govern our social 
transactions. In other words, rather than an epistemic function 
to gain knowledge about internal states of subjects, proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions have a social function to exculpate 
or condemn courses of behavior.
The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of a dif-
ferent strike against the standard view. Instead of question-
ing the centrality of mindreading, I shall question another 
basic assumption behind the received view: folk psychological 
descriptivism. According to folk psychological descriptivism 
(FP-descriptivism hereafter), propositional attitude ascrip-
tions are descriptions of the psychological states underlying 
the behavior of the attributee. In order to make the case 
against this semantic assumption, I shall start from the het-
erodox idea that ascribing beliefs and desires are a type of 
justificatory tool that function as reactive response to puzzling 
behaviors. After that, I maintain that propositional attitude 
ascriptions possess an evaluative character; ascribing beliefs 
and desires is to ascribe different grades of responsibilities to 
a particular reason to exculpate or condemn the attributee’s 
behavior or speech acts. This evaluative function, I hold, is 
incompatible with the descriptive assumption behind the 
received view. Those arguments, I conclude, point to an 
alternative semantic approach to mental ascriptions: Expres-
sivism. According to this view, propositional attitude verbs 
have an expressive meaning, that is, they function to regu-
late social agents’ actions by expressing different attitudes 
(responsibility, merit, conviction) to a particular content. 
Finally, I advance other possible virtues of expressivism for 
solving two classic problems in philosophy of mind. 
Folk psychological descriptivism 
A visible idea in the different disputes concerning the 
nature of folk psychology is that the outputs of folk psy-
chological capacities are descriptions of psychological states 
(Bartsch and Wellman, 1995, p. 4-5; Botterill, 1996, p. 115; 
Goldman, 2006, p. 100; Gopnik, 1996, p. 187; Gopnik and 
Meltzoff, 1997, p. 13-42; Leslie, 2000, p. 207-208; Leslie and 
Thaiss, 1992, p. 231; Perner, 1991, p. 38-40; Wellman 1990, 
p. 9-10). This idea is widely accepted in the debate concern-
ing the nature and development of folk psychological mech-
anisms. All parts in the discussion seem to share this basic 
2 Certainly, the term ‘reasoning’ must be taken in a broad sense to include inferential or computational sub-personal processes that 
produce representational outputs (see Spaulding, 2015, p. 475-476, for a discussion). Thank you to an anonymous referee for calling 
my attention to this.
3 In later developments, several authors tried to develop certain hybrid versions considering some combination of the processes (Car-
ruthers, 2006; Goldman, 2006; Nichols and Stich, 2003).
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model of what it is to ascribe a propositional attitude (see 
Apperly, 2011). According to this model, ascribing a prop-
ositional attitude is to describe or convey a psychological 
state. Paradigmatically, a relation (attitude) connecting an 
agent (I, you, she, he) with a proposition (e.g., it is raining; 
Berlin is the capital of Germany; the building is on fire). The 
primary goal of a mindreader is to reason about the role of 
these attitudes in bringing out a particular behavior. For in-
stance, if I attribute to someone the belief that the building 
is on fire, I can predict her next action will be to run away 
from the building. Thus, engaging in such reasoning requires 
the mindreader to describe these psychological states caus-
ing behavior. For instance, in Gopnik and Meltzoff’s (1997) 
discussions concerning the parallelisms between scientific 
practices and children’s development of theory of mind, we 
can find several references to the practice of theorizing as 
one of finding descriptions or pictures of the phenomenon:
Once, as children, we have engaged in the 
theorizing necessary to specify the features 
of our world, most of us most of the time 
may simply go on to the central evolution-
ary business of feeding and reproducing. 
But, we suggest, these powerful theorizing 
abilities continue to allow all of us some 
of the time and some of us, namely pro-
fessional scientists, much of the time to 
continue to discover more and more about 
the world around us (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 
1997, p. 20). 
The primary function of our cognitive development, 
including folk psychological development, is that it gives us a 
better understanding of the world outside ourselves. 
This conception of propositional attitude ascriptions is 
a type of descriptivism. Descriptivism is a general semantic 
conception according to which the function of declarative 
sentences is to state facts, and sub-sentential expressions 
(names and predicates) denote, refer to or stand for objects, 
properties and relations in the world. This semantic concep-
tion is behind what Austin (1962) called the “descriptive 
fallacy” (see also Ryle, 1949, p. 56, 115; Belnap, 1990, p. 1). 
This fallacy is captured by what nowadays Chrisman (2007, 
p. 227) calls “the dogma of descriptivism in philosophical se-
mantics, whereby it’s assumed that since semantic content 
of indicative sentences is standardly given in terms of their 
truth-conditions, the characteristic function of all indicative 
sentences is to describe worldly objects, properties, and rela-
tions”. This semantic dogma, I believe, underlies the propo-
sitional attitude ascription models behind the received view 
in folk psychology. 
When the descriptivist dogma is applied to folk psy-
chology, we have a conception of mental state ascriptions as 
descriptions or (meta)-representations of psychological states. 
For our purpose, they are descriptions that depict the real 
psychological states of the subject of attribution. So, we can 
define folk psychological descriptivism as follows: Propositional 
attitude ascriptions describe or stand for particular psycho-
logical entities (beliefs, desires, hopes) causally connected to 
behaviors and perceptions. Paradigmatically, propositional 
attitude ascriptions describe an attitude-relation (denoted by 
the psychological verb) which connects an agent (denoted by 
the name of the attributee or pronouns) to a content (denot-
ed by the that-clause). 
A possible objection to this characterization is that de-
scriptivism is a semantic conception of natural language ex-
pressions, while the outputs of mindreading mechanisms are 
mental (meta-representational) states. However, FP-descrip-
tivism applies to different semantic bearers. In fact, it is not 
unusual to find expressions such as “state-descriptions” (Bot-
terill, 1996) or “descriptions of psychological states” (Leslie, 
2000) as referring to the outputs of mindreading mechanisms. 
In any case, the importance of characterizing descriptivism is 
to provide an approximation to a particular understanding of 
the function that ascriptions and mental concepts play in our 
social interactions. In this sense, the interest of the definition 
is to distinguish functionally descriptive-states or sentences 
from action-guiding states or sentences which do not carry 
information about the world, i.e., states or sentences which 
provide evaluations by giving action-guiding information 
(Charlow, 2014, 2015; Lewis, 1979) that specifies particular 
behavioral patterns. 
In light of this, the argument I offer in this paper will 
make the case for the idea that propositional attitudes ascrip-
tions possess an action-guiding component. That is, mental 
states ascriptions are not descriptions of private psychological 
states, but evaluations concerning certain responsibilities and 
commitments toward a particular content. 
Folk Psychology: Mindreading 
or social cover?
This section will argue that the main function of prop-
ositional attitude ascriptions, justification, is incompatible 
with FP-descriptivism. An important premise of this argu-
ment considers that the primary propositional function is 
justificatory. This implies aligning myself with the hetero-
dox view I characterized in the “Introduction”. In order to 
make my case, I shall present some of the motivations be-
hind the idea that propositional attitude ascriptions are not 
as pervasive as is supposed by the received view; i.e., they are 
usually restricted to contexts of justification and elucidation 
of counter-normative behavior. After that, I claim that this 
function of ascriptions is evaluative, and thus incompatible 
with descriptivism.
Prediction without mentalizing 
The primary argumentative strategy against the re-
ceived view consists in undermining the centrality of prop-
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ositional attitude ascriptions in both prediction and expla-
nation. Concerning prediction, the received view has to deal 
with the tractability problem (Zawidzki, 2008, 2013), i.e., the 
impossibility of propositional attitude ascriptions to produce 
reliable predictions. In principle, a particular course of action 
is compatible with possessing many different mental states. 
This implies that our mind has to deal with a high degree of 
indeterminacy to predict a given behavior:
Human interactions are too complex to 
succumb to folk psychological prediction 
because human decision-making is usually 
strategic: to predict what other agents will 
do on the basis of accurate mental state as-
criptions, agents would have to take into ac-
count what other agents think that they will 
do, what other agents think that they think 
others will do, etc. Such an intractable spi-
ral of higher orders of intentionality would 
inevitably swamp interpreters seeking to 
predict behavior on the basis of mental 
state ascriptions. Humans also usually pur-
sue outcomes that are defined in terms of 
the motives and other mental states of their 
fellows. This makes preferences inherently 
unstable. Because the process of making 
and enacting a decision may reveal or even 
change others’ mental states, preferred 
outcomes change as one pursues them (Za-
widzki, 2008, p. 145).
Giving this grade of under-determinacy, attributing a 
set of mental states to anticipate a course of behavior is an 
intractable enterprise. A pair belief/desire is consistent with 
many different situations and actions. Thus, anticipations re-
garding beliefs and desires would produce systematic failures 
of prediction. This problem is more pressing if one considers 
the holism of the mental. Even if we can attribute a more or 
less accurate attribution of desires and beliefs to an agent, 
there is a high probability that the agent has other mental 
states (preferences, emotions, etc.) that inhibit the action we 
anticipate. Thus, we have reasons to discard belief and desire 
ascriptions as the reliable anticipatory capacity supposed by 
the received view. 
Secondly, the research in social psychology does not speak 
in favor of the received view. As Andrews (2012) argues, em-
pirical psychology demonstrates that rather than relying on 
propositional attribution, our predictive capacities seem to be 
driven by what agents ought to do according to norms con-
cerning situations, stereotypes and social rules. For instance, 
we categorize people according to social roles or gender and 
exploit the information regarding this categorization in or-
der to produce expectations (Greenwald et al., 2009; Olivola 
and Todorov, 2010; Clement and Krueger, 2002). Female in-
fants are expected to be more vulnerable in some situations 
than male infants, and we tend to associate different roles 
with each gender (Golombok and Fivush, 1994). Then, we 
exploit what Kalish and Lawson (2008) have called “deontic 
relations”: information about what a person should do or be 
like depending on this category. Stereotypes are one of those 
normative structures that police our interactions. It deserves 
mention that those social categories are not based on induc-
tively inferred knowledge. We do not treat males and females 
differently because of differences in behavior; we treat them 
as we do because we assume they should behave according to 
gender category. Other sources for anticipation rely on social 
norms: civic standards, etiquette rules, traffic norms, cultural 
norms, and so on. These norms facilitate our interactions by 
enabling people to anticipate what others will do on the basis 
of what they should do according to them. Maibom explains 
this point as follows:
Consider how people behave in restaurants. 
What the person who waits on guests does, 
he does qua waiter; his desire to take some-
body’s order is a function of him seeing 
himself as a waiter and is quite independent 
of his personal desires and preferences gen-
erally. When, perusing the menu, the other 
person sees him approaching, she infers 
that he is coming to take her order, but to 
do so she need only understand that this is 
what waiters do with customers and that he 
is a waiter and she is a customer. What he, 
personally, desires is irrelevant to the cus-
tomer’s prediction of what he will do and 
what she ought to do and vice versa (Mai-
bom, 2007, p. 568). 
Cultural norms regulate our social interactions, so we 
expect people to behave according to them. This information 
can be exploited to produce predictions about others’ behav-
ior without postulating any mental entity. 
Finally, humans anticipate others’ behavior through 
the circumstances in which the action is performed (Heider, 
1958). Some of the norms regulating our behavior attend to 
general standards of rationality. By assuming agents are ratio-
nal, we anticipate their actions depending on how they should 
behave in accordance with the circumstances. Traditionally, 
this capacity has been understood in terms of beliefs and de-
sires (Dennett, 1987). However, as Zawidzki claims:
Such interpretative competence does not 
require speculating about concrete, unob-
servable causes of behavior or appreciating 
that these causes are full-blown proposi-
tional attitudes, that is, states with content 
represented via individually variable modes 
of presentation and holistically constrained 
influence on behavior. It requires only a 
sensitivity to certain abstract properties of 
bouts of behavior, namely, that they aim at 
specific goals and constitute the most ratio-
nal means to those goals given environmen-
tal constraints (Zawidzki, 2013, p. 15). 
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We can generate expectations about others’ actions 
without taking into consideration the inner states of our 
targets. Of course, these empirical results do not present a 
problem for the received view, but they do impose important 
restrictions on its explanatory scope.
Summing up, we have reasons to think that belief and 
desire ascriptions do not play the important role in prediction 
the received view has supposed. Rather than describing men-
tal states for the sake of prediction, humans seem to anticipate 
others’ actions by assuming they will follow certain rational 
and social norms. In other words, we exploit social heuristics 
concerning normative standards about how social creatures 
ought to behave.
Explanation as a form of justification 
Now, the question is whether or not propositional at-
titude ascriptions play a pervasive role in explanation. Note 
that according to FP-descriptivism, failures of anticipation 
must be taken as failures in the process of interpretation, that 
is, failures in the postulates of ascriptions or the information 
of the context. Given that, one may expect the attributers to 
react by revising the process, for instance, replacing the men-
tal state postulated previously by a more accurate one. When 
people behave in such a way as to contravene our expecta-
tions, we must have failed somehow in our descriptions of the 
states or inferential processes. The metaphor of the scientist 
is especially illuminating in this case. As a scientist who fails 
to anticipate the results of an experiment, a folk psychologist 
can fail in her ascriptions, in considering the variables involved 
(contextual information) or in the inferential process. 
The problem with this picture is that humans do not al-
ways react to failures of anticipation in this way. Our reactive 
responses do not just include explanations; we respond to fail-
ures of anticipation by deploying other restorative strategies: 
sanctioning the behavior, asking for reasons, or excusing the 
target’s behavior. This point has been strongly emphasized by 
several authors (Andrews, 2015; McGeer, 2007, 2015; Zaw-
idzki, 2013). For instance, McGeer says:
In my view, what is most noteworthy in these 
cases is the fact that folk psychologists 
have, as part of their overall competence, 
myriad techniques for identifying, excusing, 
blaming, accepting responsibility, apolo-
gizing and otherwise restoring confidence 
in the efficacy of the normative structures 
that govern the behavior of individuals who 
ought to be explicable and predictable us-
ing the techniques of folk psychology, even 
though sometimes they are not, in other 
words, folk psychologist treat lapses of ra-
tionality, not just as “surd spots” in an ex-
planatory/predictive theory, but as reasons 
to take some kind of remedial or restorative 
action (2007, p. 142). 
Rather than exhibiting failures of the interpreter to de-
scribe the accurate inner causes of the behavior, our profiles 
of responses show that we take those failures as anomalies 
in the interpreters’ capacity to deal with the social situation. 
At least in some cases, it is the target who is failing to do what 
she ought to. Explaining the behavior is not the unique re-
sponse we exercise when our expectation fails. A terrible re-
minder of those regulative practices is the type of responses 
that society deploys to make others conform to gender or 
ethnic norms (micro-inequities). For instance, as the Chil-
ean rapper Ana Tijoux comments in an interview for femi-
nist magazine Pikara: “It never ceases to amaze me that they 
still ask me who takes care of my children when I go on tour. 
This is a question they do not make to men who are fathers” 
(Bouza, 2015). Stereotypes generate certain expectations as 
normalized behaviors, ways of thinking and feeling and, in 
general, a set of oughts to which the person must conform due 
to being categorized in a particular way.
Of course, providing explanations is an important part 
of those restorative responses, but they are bound to the elu-
cidation of counter-normative behavior as well. As Andrews 
puts it: 
Given an understanding of norms in a soci-
ety, and the ability to recognize and sanc-
tion violations, there developed a need to 
understand actions that violated the norms. 
Explanations for norm-violating behavior 
that didn’t cite a person’s reasons either 
led to excluding the individual (e.g., “He 
Φed because he is crazy, so let’s stop shar-
ing meat with him”), or they failed to satis-
fy those who demand an explanation. This 
need to have a satisfactory reason for the 
behavior of one’s companions is what drives 
the need to develop another sort of expla-
nation, namely reason explanations. There 
is a significant benefit to being able to ex-
plain behavior that violates norms, because 
explanations of the right sort can also serve 
to justify behavior (Andrews, 2009, p. 445). 
In contexts where social understanding is governed by 
norms, it makes sense to have the possibility of justifying be-
havior and making it understandable in order to avoid public 
sanctions. Reason explanations are also a possible reactive re-
sponse when our behavior is perceived as anomalous or when 
we are encouraged to exculpate ourselves. 
When someone questions our actions or speech acts, 
when someone asks us for our reasons to act or notices our 
incongruences, we provide different reasons to exculpate our 
actions. On other occasions, we attempt to exculpate others 
for something they did, or we try to find a reason to condemn 
their behavior because we consider it immoral or inappro-
priate. In general, providing reasons is a tool for social cover 
when facing the possibility that our actions could be open to 
sanction. Propositional attitude ascriptions are reasons used 
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as reactive responses4 as well. For instance, one may need to 
appeal to propositional attitudes when someone questions 
our actions: “Why are you not dressed yet?” “I thought it 
was earlier” or “Why did you get up so early?” “I want to go 
running before going to my class”. Other situations that de-
mand the use of propositional attitude ascriptions are those 
contexts in which someone notices our errors and we need 
to excuse the mistake: “I came late because I thought the film 
started at six”; “He believed that he could do a better job”. 
In other situations, we want to indicate our degree or lack of 
support concerning an assertion to anticipate possible nega-
tive reactions: “Propaganda of the deed, I believe, is a fair po-
litical action”; “Socialism, Chávez believed, is the best solution 
for Latin-America”. Other times, we want to do the opposite, 
for instance, reacting to a possible disagreement with a chal-
lenging tone (“I believe in evolution”). In any case, all these 
examples share the basic function of reacting to possible in-
dications of violations of social norms, that is, the possibility 
that a certain course of action is contravening a norm. 
In fact, in a recent empirical study, Korman and Mal-
le (2016) have shown that people offer many more reasons 
in terms of mental states when they face puzzling actions in 
contrast to ordinary actions. In these experiments, a group of 
participants were presented with situations where behaviors 
were “puzzling with respect to social perceivers’ prior knowl-
edge and expectancies about behavior in general” (Korman 
and Malle, 2016, p. 3), in contrast to another group which 
was presented with ordinary behaviors. Although both groups 
provided a similar number of explanations, the group pre-
sented with puzzling behavior tended to provide more reason 
explanations (in contrast to trait or causal explanations) and 
mental state explanations than the other. This seems to sup-
port the idea that reason explanations in general and mental 
state attribution in particular are reactive responses to anom-
alous behavior, those behaviors that contravene the norma-
tive standards governing social situations. 
Another way to observe that propositional attitudes 
are reasons governed by normative structures that help us to 
normalize behavior is that they are not always acceptable in 
social circumstances. Reasons are not always permissible giv-
en social standards (Tanney, 2013). Suppose a firefighter is 
ready to run into a burning building, but she flies out of the 
building. Now, imagine we ask the firefighter why she fled. 
She answers that she wanted something to eat, and so left the 
building. Consider how awkward we would find this answer. 
As Tanney notes: 
we would reject this as an explanation on 
the grounds that it does not make sense. 
Suppose she says that it makes perfect 
sense to her why she would drop everything 
– even put lives at risk – because she wanted 
something to eat. We just do not under-
stand what it is like for her when she wants 
something. Indeed, she is right: we do not 
understand (Tanney, 2013, p. 143-144). 
The reason why such an explanation would not make 
sense to us is because according to our standards, saving peo-
ple from fire is more valuable than eating. Propositional atti-
tude ascriptions are governed by standards of normalization. 
In order to justify or condemn a pattern of behavior, we 
need to consider the subject responsible for his actions. In this 
sense, those uses of ascriptions have an evaluative function. 
In those contexts, when we ascribe a propositional attitude 
we are burdening the subject with the responsibility or credit 
derived from undertaking the content. Those uses of propo-
sitional attitude ascriptions can only play the role of justify-
ing or condemning a particular behavior insofar as they have 
the function of assessing the subject as someone committed 
to what is followed from the content. FP-descriptivism pre-
supposes that mental verbs describe the psychological states of 
the attributees. However, considering attributions as descrip-
tions of psychological states does not capture the action-guid-
ing component of the reason. Notice that this does not mean 
that our ascriptions do not have descriptive uses. However, 
my point of contention is that ascriptions of propositional at-
titude in a folk psychological situation, like those mentioned 
above, are paradigmatically used with evaluative purposes. 
In those circumstances, using a reason that includes a prop-
ositional attitude involves a specification of how to evaluate 
the agent. In particular, her position toward the reason and 
specification about the behavioral responses of the agent. For 
instance, when someone says “the firefighter came into the 
building because he thought there was someone inside”, we are 
making the firefighter responsible for the content (there was 
someone inside) in order to justify the action. As I claimed 
in the section “Folk psychological descriptivism”, the type of 
action-guiding information specified by the ascriptions seems 
to differ from the type of information provided by descrip-
tive-states or expressions. In general, the function of these 
propositional attitudes is required in cases where we need to 
explore responsibilities, degrees of approval, convictions and, 
in general, when we adopt an evaluative stance towards the 
behavior of our interpretee. This evaluative stance does not 
seem to be captured by FP-descriptivism. 
Reasons, facts and evaluation
 
Before I present the expressivist alternative, let me con-
sider a possible objection to the argument I have presented 
thus far. Consider that someone accepts that propositional 
attitude ascriptions involve evaluations, but argues that there 
are other types of reason explanations with the same evalua-
4 Other paradigmatic uses of normative concepts as reactive responses are truth attributions (see Ramsey, 1991 [1927], p. 12; Frápolli 
2013, p. 79) or ascriptions of irrationality (Hayward, 2017).
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tive component, which do not involve propositional attitudes. 
Thus, what distinguishes propositional attitude ascriptions is 
not their evaluative character but their reference to inner psy-
chological states of the subject.
An important part of our explanations does not require 
us to make reference to propositional attitudes. These rea-
sons are factive (Strijbos and de Bruin, 2012, 2013), that is, 
they are reasons of the type “S performs the action because 
of P” where P states facts and values enabling or entitling the 
behavior. For instance, we say that Mary ran away because 
the building was on fire, or that Anthony went out to have a 
real espresso. Although these reasons do not appeal to mental 
states, they introduce the evaluative component specified be-
fore; we evaluate a person by introducing a fact that plays a 
role in the justification of the behavior. Those facts entitle or 
support the action on the basis of certain standards (Bruner, 
1990; Hutto, 2004; Strijbos and de Bruin, 2012). Elucidating 
and normalizing behaviors implies attending to non-obvious 
events and circumstances that make the behavior normal. 
Reasons fill in the missing details or help to appreciate the 
circumstances surrounding the action in order to explain it. 
These explanations involve pointing out and tracking the 
relevant events that normalize the target’s behavior, without 
explicit reference to her inner states. 
Having said that, one may buy into the idea that both 
factive and mental reasons introduce the same evaluative 
component; but exploiting the disanalogy between factive 
reasons and reasons in terms of propositional attitude in order 
to argue that the difference lies in the descriptions of psycho-
logical facts of the propositional attitude ascriptions. In other 
words, while the evaluative function is shared by all types of 
reasons, the distinction between factive and mental reasons 
resides in the description of the inner psychological reality of 
the subject. 
What this objection does not take into account is that 
providing a folk psychological explanation is to evaluate a per-
son as acknowledging the situation and what is behaviorally 
connected with it. In a sense, we are giving a special status to 
this person; we are considering what she must do as a social 
creature with certain duties and commitments. But this does 
not require that we appeal to her mental profile or describe 
her internal states. Human anticipatory and explanatory ca-
pacities do not require describing propositional attitudes or 
psychological states of the target. This normalizing strategy 
does not require describing mental states, rather than evalu-
ating the subject as someone responsible for the action and 
who acknowledges the normative connection between the 
situation and the action she performed. 
What is special about ascribing propositional attitudes, 
in contrast to factive reasons, is the degree of specificity con-
cerning the evaluation. Consider the following examples: 
(1) Why did he refuse dessert? He’s been 
gaining weight. 
(1’) Why did he refuse dessert? He thinks 
that he has been gaining weight. 
(2) Why is she taking the car to work? Be-
cause she is late. 
(2’) Why is she taking the car to work? Be-
cause she believes that she is late. 
(3) Why did Ben call Anne? They would get 
back together. 
(3’) Why did Ben call Anne? He hoped they 
would get back together. 
(4) Why did she go to the coffee shop? To 
have an espresso. 
(4’) Why did she go to the coffee shop? She 
wanted to have an espresso. 
When contrasting (1–4) with (1’–4’), the difference 
between the explanations seems to lie in how specific they 
are about the commitments undertaken by the evaluation. 
For instance, by uttering (1), the attributer assesses the tar-
get as being responsible for gaining weight, which counts as 
a reason to support the behavior. On the contrary, by utter-
ing (1’), the attributer is being more specific; he is indicating 
that it is only the attributee who is responsible for those 
commitments. This allows the attributer to remain neutral 
with respect to the acceptance of the fact that the target is 
gaining weight. This is the reason why it would be weird 
to say “He’s been gaining weight but I am not sure”. But 
it would make sense to say “He thinks he is gaining weight 
but I am not sure”. Factive reasons are a default form of 
knowledge attribution (Gordon, 2000; Strijbos and de 
Bruin, 2013); they presuppose that the subject shares the 
same knowledge of facts about the world the attributee is 
considering. A similar claim may be supported concerning 
the other examples. Propositional attitude verbs – such as 
“guess”, “suppose”, “know”, “want” – manifest the attribut-
er’s evaluation concerning the attributee’s position regard-
ing the content. That is, different degrees of approval, dis-
approval, conviction or other attitudes towards the reason 
accounting for the behavior of the agent. The reason why 
we introduce mental verbs instead of using factive reasons 
is to be more specific concerning the commitments. But the 
point is that what makes reasons in terms of proposition-
al attitudes distinctive is not that they describe the inner 
psychological reality of the subject, but the specifications 
concerning the evaluation. 
In a nutshell, reason explanations are regularly used as 
tools to justify or condemn particular patterns of behavior 
when they contravene a norm or deviate from a normal pat-
tern. They can fulfill this function in social situations because 
they are evaluations, that is, they indicate some merit, credit 
or responsibility of the subject toward a content. Propositional 
attitude verbs function as tools to allow greater specification 
about the evaluation. They introduce information about how 
the subject must guide her behavior according to the evalua-
tion. This action-guiding information is substantially differ-
ent from the descriptive information about the world that 
descriptive expressions introduce. Thus, FP-descriptivism 
cannot account for what we do in our social circumstances by 
deploying propositional attitude ascriptions. 
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The expressivist solution
Now, we are well positioned to understand the semantic 
challenge that the received view must face. If propositional 
attitude notions are evaluative concepts we use (paradigmati-
cally) in justificatory contexts, our ascriptions cannot be mere 
descriptions of internal psychological states. The problem is 
not only that the received view has wrongly considered our 
folk psychological practice to be an epistemic enterprise, but 
also that it has confused the nature of the concepts we exer-
cise in our social practices. Our mental vocabulary does not 
describe psychological entities; on the contrary, it provides 
guides or injunctions about how to evaluate an agent, specify-
ing her level of responsibility, conviction or merit toward the 
reason. This evaluative function is manifested in the practical 
aspect of the ascriptions. Assessing someone implies that we 
expect a particular behavioral profile given the position of 
merit or responsibility the assessor attributes to her. That is 
why evaluative vocabulary has a unique connection with ac-
tion. As Strandberg claims in relation to moral vocabulary, it 
“enables us to regulate one another’s behaviour… [it] is gener-
ally utilized to get us to act, or to get us to refrain from acting, 
in certain ways so as to adjust our various actions in relation 
to one another” (2012, p. 89). Similarly, propositional attitude 
verbs have the capacity of adjusting and regulating our actions 
as derivate from its evaluative function. 
The considerations of the previous paragraphs speak in 
favor of an expressivist view5 about propositional attitude as-
criptions. We can characterize expressivism as defending two 
claims6: (1) propositional attitude verbs do not describe or de-
note any entity, relation or property; (2) propositional attitude 
verbs express or voice attributee’s position regarding responsi-
bility, convictions or merit toward a particular content. In the 
arena of social situations, this is translated into expressing the 
attributee’s commitment to acting according to (or defending) 
a particular reason that otherwise normalizes the pattern of 
behavior of the target. Rather than a scientist, folk psycholo-
gists are as lawyers who advocate on behalf of their client to 
avoid public sanction, or as a prosecutor who attempts to find 
a way to condemn her (Zawidzki, forthcoming). Paradigmat-
ically, ascribing beliefs and desires is practiced in the contexts 
of excusing, justifying or condemning counter-normative be-
haviors, solving disputes or voicing others. In those contexts, it 
makes sense to have the capacity of indicating to our interlocu-
tor which responsibilities or merits we must attribute in order 
to exculpate or condemn those behaviors. 
Expressivism seems to be useful in order to account for 
the semantic challenge expressed above. If propositional atti-
tude ascriptions are types of reasons to normalize and justify 
actions, there must be a distinctive feature of mentalizing that 
distinguishes it from factive reasons. This feature, I have at-
tempted to argue, is an evaluative function. We use belief and 
desire ascriptions to attribute responsibilities and merits to 
others in order to condemn or justify their behavior. Howev-
er, this is incompatible with a descriptive semantic. Evaluating 
implies that one expresses an accepting attitude toward a set 
of norms, not only to denote world entities. Thus, the expres-
sivist alternative is a more plausible account for the evaluative 
aspect. Furthermore, insofar as the received view relies on 
the idea that we are describing the causally efficacious events 
underlying agents’ action, expressivism aligns with the alter-
natives to the received view that undermine the role of mental 
ascriptions in explanation. 
Concluding remarks: 
Future research
Human abilities in tackling social situations are diverse. 
We exploit different heuristics to explain, predict and make 
sense to each other. The received view has failed to appreci-
ate this diversity and it has assumed that our ascriptions of 
mental states are the linchpin of social cognition. However, if 
the heterodox view is right, our ascriptions only emerge in the 
context of justification and rationalization of counter-nor-
mative patterns of action. This observation not only presents 
an important restriction to the use of mindreading; it also 
reflects a deeper problem for the received view: the incompat-
ibility of its semantic assumption with the primary function 
of propositional attitude ascriptions. In this sense, expressiv-
ism concerning ascriptions presents a better understanding of 
their evaluative character. Nonetheless, I would like to place 
expressivism on a safer footing by sketching some of its virtues 
beyond the scope of this essay. In particular, I want to high-
light how expressivism concerning folk psychology could be 
cashed out to approach two classic problems in philosophy of 
mind: the ontological load of folk psychology and under-de-
terminacy of ascriptions. 
In the philosophical areas in which expressivism is a 
renowned contender, its main credential is the capacity of 
explaining the role of certain vocabularies without undertak-
ing strong ontological commitments. Ethical expressivism, 
for instance, is usually presented as a semantic solution to 
the controversy concerning the existence of sui generis moral 
facts (Chrisman, 2007). In this sense, I would like to provide 
a superficial view of how expressivism about folk psychology 
could put forward a similar move in the debate concerning the 
ontological commitment of our ascriptions.  
5 Expressivist views have been successfully defended in several philosophical fields. For instance, meta-ethics (Gibbard, 2003) or me-
ta-epistemology (Chrisman, 2007; Field, 2009). However, the expressivist views about folk psychology are not very common in the 
literature (see Boghossian, 1990, for an exception).
6 For a minimal characterization of expressivism and an insightful analysis of those two claims, see Frapolli and Villanueva (2012).
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During the eighties, Churchland (1981) presented several 
important arguments to favor Eliminative Materialism, accord-
ing to which our common-sense understanding of the mind is 
deeply mistaken. From this view, our mental vocabulary refers 
to theoretical entities postulated to understand each other, but 
neurosciences and neuropsychology prove them to be wrong. 
Thus, we should substitute our folk psychological vocabulary 
for the vocabulary of neuroscience. Eliminative materialism 
contrasts with two views. On the one hand, intentional real-
ism (Fodor, 1987) holds that our folk psychological vocabulary 
refers to real functional states implemented in the brain. From 
this perspective, our folk psychological concepts reflect more 
or less accurate descriptions of the mental states and processes 
underlying our behavior. On the other hand, one may consider 
that our common-sense conception of the mind is a useful in-
strument for prediction and explanation without assuming on-
tological commitments about the nature of the states to which 
our mental concepts refer (Dennett, 1987). 
Now, expressivism may put forward the strategy of un-
dermining the descriptivist assumption behind the three po-
sitions. Note that the expressivist view supposes to save some 
intuitions behind the controversy without being committed 
to any particular ontological position. Considering proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions as non-descriptive avoids under-
taking any particular position (realist, mild-realist or fiction-
alist) with regard to the ontology of our ascriptions. Thus, 
expressivism seems to dissolve the problem of the ontology 
without loss of explanatory power. In other words, dropping 
the descriptivist assumption behind eliminativism, realism 
and fictionalism, allows us to dissolve the ontological debate 
and maintain the importance and autonomy of our folk psy-
chological vocabulary. 
Furthermore, expressivism is well situated to account 
for what is sometimes called the problem of under-determi-
nation of folk psychological ascriptions (Dennett, 1978, 1987; 
Hutto, 2013). On several occasions, our folk psychological as-
criptions “fail to yield clear, stable verdicts about which beliefs 
and desires to attribute to a person” (Dennett, 1987, p. 29). 
This under-determinacy is particularly apparent in contexts 
where two interpreters disagree about a particular ascrip-
tion. For example, Dennett invites us to consider the case of 
Sam, an art critic who has promoted the paintings of his son. 
In principle, there are two possible interpretations of the sit-
uation: “(a) Sam does not believe the paintings are any good, 
but out of loyalty and love he does this to help his son, or (b) 
Sam’s love for his son has blinded him to the faults of the 
paintings, and he actually believes they are good” (Dennett, 
1978, p. 39). Frequently, those disagreements persist despite 
the evidence regarding the circumstances of the attribution 
being clear for all parts. In other words, there are not facts 
that determine the truth of the attribution (Dennett, 1978). 
Dennett considers this under-determinacy as an argument in 
favor of his ontological position, according to which proposi-
tional attitude ascriptions refers to mild-real entities.7
In light of this, expressivism starts with the idea that 
attributions are evaluative in nature. Two attributers can 
disagree about whether or not an agent believes or desires 
something because they have different evaluative aims or 
different norms under which they evaluate the target. This 
would explain why a disagreement concerning two interpre-
tations can persist even when the two participants in the de-
bate recognize the same facts (Field, 2009). Even when both 
speakers are in agreement about the relevant facts and they 
recognize that from different standards different attributions 
follow, they can still disagree because they resist abandoning 
their supportive attitude to the norm (coherence/credibility). 
Thus, belief attributions have an action-guiding component 
supporting standards of attribution. The source of disagree-
ment is not a worldly aspect we describe; rather, it is an evalu-
ative attitude component that the speaker indicates with the 
attribution. Of course, an expressivist treatment of these two 
problems requires further elaboration. However, this is suffi-
cient to prompt us to consider the potential of expressivism 
as serious contender to the semantic of our propositional atti-
tude ascriptions and its consequences for philosophy of mind. 
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